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RECENT CASES
Agency-War-Effect of War on Existing Agency Relationships-[New York].-
In 1914, plaintiff's predecessors in interest, who lived in Germany, engaged defendant,
a resident of New York, as their agent to perform general agency services for reinsurers
in the United States. After the War, the defendant began procuring fire reinsurance
treaties and received commissions on the premiums arising therefrom. Plaintiffs main-
tain that the defendant received all commissions as their agent. The trial court held
that the declaration of war by the United States against Germany in 1917, together
with the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act, terminated the agency agree-
ment between the parties, and that the defendant, being free to make his own arrange-
ments, had acquired independent and absolute title to the money. It was also held
that the Alien Property Custodian had acquired plaintiff's right to the commissions by
his seizure of enemy property and that the action was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. On appeal, held, affirmed. Mvtzenbecher v. Ballard, 266 N.Y. 574 (1935).
Upon the outbreak of war, existing agency relationships are generally terminated
when the agent and principal are residents of opposed and belligerent countries.
i Mechem, Agency § 694 (1914). Some courts reach this conclusion by arguing that
since intercourse is prohibited between belligerents, any agency relation in which inter-
course is contemplated should be dissolved upon the instigation of war. Montgomery v.
U.S., 15 Wall. (U.S.) 395 (1872); Blackwell v. Willard, 65 N.C. 555 (1871). If inter-
course is not contemplated, the relationship is not dissolved. Small's Adm'r v. Lump-
kin's Ex'r, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 832 (,877) (agency to collect debts and sell property);
Williams v. Paine, 7 App. D.C. 116 (1895), aff'd 169 U.S. 55 (1897) (agency to sell
land); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 614 (1871). Other jurisdic-
tions regard all agencies as automatically terminated when hostilities begin, regardless
of the absence of actual communication. Howell v. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302 (1869) (agency
to care for certain lots of land). To justify this view, it has been urged that all agencies
involve either the actuality or the possibility of communication and intercourse. 31
Harv. L. Rev. 637 (198). The first two theories are thus influenced by substantially
similar considerations: the dangers of intercourse between belligerents. A third theory
is that the interest of the principal must determine the continuation of the agency rela-
tion. If it is in the interest of the principal that his agent in the belligerent country
should continue in that capacity, the assent of the principal will be presumed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary; but if it is against his interests, then the agency
will be presumed to have been terminated. Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U.S. 425, 429
(1877) (terminated); Williams v. Paine, i69 U.S. 55, 73 (i897) (not terminated).
Whether these views meet the needs of the community is highly debatable. Perhaps
the test of termination should be whether the relationship benefits the enemy or preju-
dices the interests of the domestic country. Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N.Y. 43 (1873).
So long as not all intercourse between belligerents is forbidden, but only that which
is opposed to public policy, agencies that do not involve loss or harm to government
might be sustained, whether or not they involve intercourse and whether or not they
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are beneficial to the principal. Such a standard, although possibly having an unfor-
tunate operation in some cases, is not only not unduly restrictive of war-time relations
but coincides with the policy of our war-time legislation, in which prevention of benefit
to the enemy, not the indiscriminate prevention of all intercourse, is the guiding objec-
tive. Tingley v. Muller, [1917] 2 Chanc. 144; Keppeirnan v. Keppelman, 89 N.J. Eq.
390, IO5 At. i4o (19r8), revd. on other grds., 91 N.J. Eq. 67, io8 Aft. 432 (1919); see
Tait v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 23 Fed. Cas. 62o, 624 (1873). There is no danger inherent in
intercourse. It is only when it prejudices the interests of the government that the
agency relation which induced it should be terminated. Cf. 31 Harv. L. Rev. 637
(1918). The unfairness of such termination by means of the orthodox approach is par-
ticularly evident in the principal case, where the defendant was not held bound to his
agency contract though he did not begin his work until 1919, when hostilities had
ceased.
Bankruptcy-Preferences-Date for Determining Preferential Character of Pay-
ment-[Massachusetts].-Action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover
partial payments made by the bankrupt to the defendant creditor within four months
of filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The defendant maintained that no preference
was effected because, at the time of the payment, the debtor's assets were large enough
to have permitted similar payments to all creditors. Held, there was a preference, be-
cause the preferential character of a transfer is determined as of the time of the peti-
tion, not of the transfer. Brown v. Pahner Clay Products Co., 195 N.E. 122 (Mass.
1935).
Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as a transfer within four
months of the bankruptcy petition, by an insolvent debtor, when "the effect of the
enforcement of such .... transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class."
36 Stat. 842 (igio), ii U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (1927). One construction of this section is
that it applies to transfers which enable one creditor to obtain a greater percentage at
the time of the transfer. Another view extends it to transfers which in the future will
effect such inequality. 4 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1813 (3d ed., 1923). Thus, a pay-
ment when the debtor's assets would permit like payments to all creditors is not prefer-
ential under the first construction (Peck & Co. v. Whitmer, 231 Fed. 893 (C.C.A. 8th
1916); Haas v. Sachs, 68 F. (2d) 623 (C.C.A. 8th 1933)), while it is preferential under
the second if the ultimate result of the transfer, in view of the failure to make equal
payments to all creditors, is that one creditor obtains a greater percentage of his debt
than do the others. Rubenstein v. LottoW, 220 Mass. i56, i1 N.E. 973 (1916); Com-
merce-Guardian Trust & Saving Bank v. Devlin, 6 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1925);
Eyges v. Boylston National Bank, 294 Fed. 286 (D.C. Mass. 1923).
Under § 6ob, a voidable preference exists when an insolvent debtor makes a transfer
within the four month period, if the "transfer then operate as a preference, and the per-
son receiving it .... shall then have reasonable cause to believe" that the transfer
would effect a preference. 36 Stat. 842 (igio), ii U.S.C.A. § 96(b) (1927). According
to one interpretation, based upon the use of the words "then operate" and "then have
reasonable cause to believe," the determination of the preferential character of a trans-
fer must be made as of the time of the transfer because the word "then" is taken as
referring to a time specified: the time of the transfer. If at that time the creditor has
